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DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION IN FEDERAL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE*
LESTE B. ORFim**
VII. Discovery Under Rule 17(c) as Interpreted by the Courts.
Rule 17(c) makes provision for discovery before trial202 when
it provides that the court may direct that the objects designated in
the subpoena be produced before the court "at a time prior to the
trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence."203
No such provision appears in the corresponding Federal Civil Rule
45(c). A motion for inspection during the trial does not come within
the scope of Rule 17(c). 204
Rule 17(c) has been said to be a statutory implementation of
the sixth amendment which provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall have the right . . . to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor."205 Chief Justice Marshall,
sitting as a circuit justice, states that the defendant has the right
to compulsory process "as soon as he is brought into court" even
before indictment.2 06 A state court has recently stated: "There is
'no privilege which puts beyond the reach of compulsory process
evidence in the possession of police or prosecuting authorities
bearing upon the truth of the fact in issue in a criminal case. The
suppression by this means of evidence upon which the innocence
of the accused might depend would infringe his constitutional rights
'This is the second of two parts. The first part appeared at 59 W. VA. L.
REV. 221 (1957).
**Professor of Law, Indiana University. Member United States Supreme
Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure.
202 It seems to the author of this article that discovery occurs under Rule
17(c) and a broader discovery than under Rule 16. However, many will differ.
See for example Note, 67 Hxav. L. REv. 492, 494-498 (1954), which refers to
"attempted discovery" under Rule 17(c).
203 See Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure II, 56 YALE
L.J. 197, 221-222 (1947).
204 Simmons v. United States, 220 F.2d 377, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
205 United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1955). It has
been pointed out that the case law on the right to compulsory process has been
"extremely meager'. Ro1'scnEFE, CONsTrrurxoNAL LAW 797 (1939).
206 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 80, 33, No. 14,682d (C.C.D. Va.
1807). In a case allowing inspection of grand jury minutes this case was cited
as authority. State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687, 690
(1936). Another case relying on this case is Parsons v. State, 251 Ala. 467, 38
So. 2d 209, 216 (1948).
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and offend against the plainest principles of justice and policy."2 0 7
So fundamental is the right of the defendant to compulsory process
that a treaty impairing the right would seem to be invalid.208
Rule 17(c) may be used by the government as well as the
defendant for production of documentary evidence and objects,
whereas Rule 16 provides only for discovery in favor of the de-
fendant.20 9 Thus Rule 17(c) may be resorted to by the govern-
ment in grand jury investigations.2 10 The subpoena may be issued
against a corporation or individual before any specific charge is
made by the government against the corporation or individual. A
subpoena to a corporation in such a case does not violate the
incrimination provision of the fifth amendment. But if the subpoena
is unreasonable and oppressive it violates the fourth amendment
providing against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 11 Docu-
ments called for by the subpoena must be specified with reasonable
particularity and the period covered must be reasonably limited.
The subpoena need not designate each particular paper desired.
A wider range of inquiry as to documents is permitted in grand
jury investigations than in other stages of criminal proceedings. A
subpoena too broad in some of its demands may be valid if the
good demands may be separated from the bad. The subpoena will
not be applied to documents containing any military or naval
information under security classification. In passing on the subpoena
the court may look at the fact of the subpoena and other proper
207 State v. Cooper, 2 N.J. 540, 67 A.2d 298, 805 (1949), 41 J. Cnnv. L. &
CRuNoLoGY 64 (1950). The case held that the defendant could subpoena
the results of fingerprint tests on an alleged murder weapon.
208 Wright, Treaties as Law in National Courts, 82 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (1956); 4
HAcinvoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 759-760 (1942); 2 HYDE, INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 1844 (2d ed. 1945). In United States v. Trumbull, 48 Fed.
94, 98 (S.D. Cal. 1891), it was held that the government could not have com-
pulsory process, but the court distinguished and did not pass on the defendant's
right. Compare In re Dillon, 7 Sawy. 561, 7 Fed. Cas. 710 (N.D. Cal. 1854).
209 In re Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.R.D. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1947); Application
of Harry Alexander, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). For cases saying that
self-incrimination was not involved see Field v. United States, 193 F.2d 86, 91(2d Cir. 1951); United States v. Chin Lim Mow, 12 F.R.D. 433, 434 (N.D.
Cal. 1952). For the law prior to the Federal Rules see 51 YALE L.J. 687(1942).
210Application of Radio Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D. 167 (S.D.N.Y.
1952); In re Investigation of World Arrangements, etc., 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.D.C.
1952).
211 Application of Certain Chinese Family B. & D. Ass'n, 19 F.R.D. 97, 99
(N.D. Cal. 1956). A subpoena requiring all records for 25 years was too broad.
The court stated that research did not disclose any subpoena upheld for a
period of more than 27 years. Id. at 100.
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1957], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss4/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
sources such as prior proceedings in the case.2 12 It has been thought
that Rule 17(c) permitting quashing of the subpoena applies only
after an information or indictment has been returned, but that this
is inconsequential as an attack could be made under the fourth
amendment.2 13 A subpoena served on a foreign sovereign may be
quashed.2 14
When the government issues a subpoena under Rule 17(c)
to a defendant its only purpose must be for production in evidence
at the trial and not for pre-trial discovery.2 15 It is the grand jury
which has the primary role as the agency of compulsory disclosure.2 10
But subpoenas may be issued on application of the government to
others than defendants under Rule 17(c) for inspection before
trial.2 17
A corporate defendant is subject to subpoena under Rule
17(c). An individual defendant could plead self-incrimination.2 18
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice had used
such procedure against corporate defendants.2 19
When the government issues a subpoena under Rule 17(c) it
is the United States attorney who issues it. A statute authorizing
agents of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to subpoena documents
pertinent to a taxpayer's liability does not authorize the agent to
issue a subpoena merely to aid a prosecution by the Department
of Justice.220 Administrative subpoenas may not be used as a
212 Application of Henry Alexander, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y.
1949).
213 In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 18 F.R.D. 280, 283 (D.D.C.
1952).
214 Id. at 288-291. Documents in the archives of a foreign consulate are
privileged. Kessler v. Best, 121 Fed. 439 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1903); In re Dillon,
7 Fed. Cas. 710, 713 (N.D. Cal. 1854). But compare Vierick v. United States,
130 F.2d 945, 960-961 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
215 United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Mass. 1953).
216 Id. at 251. See comment on this case in 34 NEB. L. REV. 645, 659
(1955).
217 NEw YORK UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAw INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS 182 (1946).
To the same effect are Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
1, 56 YALE L.J. 197, 221-222 (1947); American Tobacco Co. v. United States,
147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944). See also Note, 67 H~av. L. R1.:v. 692, 695
(1954).
218 6 Nmv Yopx UNIv. ScHOOL OF LAW INsTrrUTE PocEE.Nmcs 197-198
(1946); Note, 51 YALE LJ. 687 n. 4 (1942); RoTrscHAEEn, CONSTrrmtnONAL
LAw 801-802, 805 (1939). But an individual must produce public records.
McCoRMICK, EVIDENcE 281-284 (1954); Note, 11 RUTrERs L. REv. 479 (1956).
219 See Rice, Trial Technique in Antitrust Cases, 7 LAv & CONTEMP. Pnon.
138, 141 (1940); Note, 51 YALE L.J. 687, 689 (1942).
220 United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Mass. 1953).
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device for compulsory disclosure of testimony to be used in
presentments of criminal cases. Hence an application for a judicial
subpoena to implement an administrative subpoena will be denied.
Where the government secures a subpoena under Rule 17(c)
disobedience constitutes contempt of court.22 1 Reliance on the
advice of counsel or belief that the subpoena is invalid will not
excuse; nor will the filing of a motion to quash. Furthermore, as
Rule 17(c) provides, the motion to quash must be made promptly.
Thus far the right of the government to subpoena under Rule
17(c) has been considered. It has been seen that the govern-
ment when it issues a subpoena to a defendant can do so only for
production at the trial and not for pretrial discovery.2 22 Further-
more an individual defendant may be able to plead self-incrimina-
tion.22 3 Thus the rights of the government to subpoena are strictly
limited. But what about the right of the defendant to subpoena
under Rule 17(c)? May the defendant secure inspection of his
own statements by subpoena to the government? This has been a
favorite subject for decision beginning as late as 1953. In the first
case on the subject the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
declined to reverse a denial of inspection as the denial was not
prejudicial on the facts.22 5 There was no prejudice as the gov-
ernment introduced the defendant's statement at the trial five
days before the defendant's psychiatrist took the stand and thd
psychiatrist testified that the defendant was of unsound mind at
the time of the crime. Nevertheless the court regarded the de-
fendant's written statement as a "paper" or "document" within
the scope of Rule 17 (e). 2 26 And the statement, which was intro-
duced in evidence at the trial was regarded as evidentiary under
the Bounnan case. In a second case a subpoena for all written state-
ments or transcripts of testimony and alleged confessions of the
221 Taylor v. United States, 221 F.2d 809, 810 (6th Cir. 1955). The pen-
alty was five months imprisonment.
Likewise the government attorney may be in contempt where he refuses
to obey a valid subpoena obtained by the defendant. Bowman Dairy v. United
States, 841 U.S. 214 (1951).
222 United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Mass. 1953).
2 2 3 RoTrscaEFER, CONSTIrTONAL LAW 801-802, 805 (1939).
224 In United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1948), it was not
clear from the opinion of the court whether the, defendant sought inspection
of his own statement or statements of others.
225 Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1953), 22 GEO.
WAsir. L. REv. 363 (1954).
226 207 F.2d 136.
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defendant was denied as the defendant failed to show that they
were not otherwise procurable by the defendant reasonably in
advance of trial by the exercise of due diligence.22 7 Thus there
was no assertion that discovery would not lie in a proper case. In
fact the court stated that "it is essential that each have an oppor-
tunity to examine before trial documents which may be introduced
against him but which he has never before seen."22 8 In the District
of Columbia a defendant was permitted inspection of his written
and signed statement.229 District Judge Goddard of the southern
district of New York denied inspection as the defendant had not
shown good cause.230 The elapsed time had been short so that
the defendant's memory should not have been dimmed. The
defendant might be able to "doctor" his testimony to fit his state-
ment. Inspection would deprive the trial of a certain spontaneity
which is helpful in arriving at the truth. The court did not deny
that the defendant might have inspection if he showed good cause.
Judge Edward P. Murphy of the northern district of California
granted inspection of the defendant's written statement in a case
transferred from the District of Columbia where inspection had
been granted.231 He did not base his decision on the fact that
the case had been transferred, and pointed out that the state-
ment was evidentiary.
Judge Thomas F. Murphy of the southern district of New
York denied inspection of the defendant's statement under Rule
17(c) and also under Rule 16 although admitting that there was
contrary precedent in the southern district of New York and in the
District of Columbia.232 In his view the Bowman case formulated
the rule to aid defendants in securing documents to introduce in
evidence at the trial; but in the case before him no such intention
existed. If the statement supported his testimony at the trial it
would be surplusage; if it impeached him, he would not use it
227 United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 272-273 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). The
court pointed out that availability of a copy is sufficient unless comparison
with the original is desirable. Opinion was by Dimock, J.
228 Ibid.
229 United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 371 (D.D.C. 1954), 1955 U.
ILL. L. FbtRum 158. The decision was by Holtzoff, J.
230 United States v. Scully, 15 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The court
relied on United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), as repre-
senting the view of the southern district of New York and on unreported de-
cisions of that district.
231 United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
232 United States v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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at the trial. Moreover good cause was not shown. Judge Leo F.
Rayfiel of the eastern district of New York allowed inspection of
the testimony of the defendant before the Superintendent of Banks
of New York.233 Such testimony was like the testimony of a de-
fendant before a grand jury which may be disclosed to the
defendant where the ends of justice require it. Judge Irving R.
Kaufman of the southern district of New York denied discovery
of defendant's statements made to government agents shortly after
his arrest.234 One statement was signed and another unsigned.
The statements would not be usable in evidence. If they sup-
ported the defendant's testimony at the trial, they were surplusage;
if they impeached, they would not be used. Delay at the trial
would not ensue as the statements were short. Moreover the
statements were available to the defendant in a transcript of a
prior trial in the hands of defendant's counsel. In a decision of
the same date by Judge Kaufman inspection was denied of the
transcript of an unsigned question and answer statement given by
the defendant to an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.235
It was doubtful whether the defendant would use such statement
as evidence; and the trial would not be unduly delayed by inspec-
tion during trial. Judge William B. Herlands denied inspection
of the defendant's unsigned oral statement to an assistant United
States attorney transcribed by a government stenographer.23 6 In-
spection is not warranted simply because the defendant wishes
to make sure that the story he tells at the trial is not impeached
by any prior inconsistent statements he made to the government.
Rule 17(c) should not be construed so as to make Rule 16 mean-
ingless. It should be construed as providing for the traditional
type of trial subpoena although it may be made returnable before
the actual date of the trial.
The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia held that
defendants could properly, request inspection of recordings of
conversations between the defendants and police officers.237 The
recordings were evidentiary under the Bowman case. But the trial
court did not err when in its discretion it denied such request
inasmuch as the defendants had already been accorded an op-
233 United States v. Kaskel, 18 F.R.D. 477, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The
court relied on United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 371 (D.D.C. 1954).
234 United States v. Loie Gim Hall, 18 F.R.D. 384, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
235 United States v. Gogel, 19 F.R.D. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
236 United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
237 Monroe v. United States, 234 F.2d 49, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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portunity by the government to inspect the recordings. The gov-
ernment would not have to allow inspection of the original
recordings where they were too fragile and where accuracy of
the reproduction was shown. In a prosecution of a corporation
and its officers for misstatement of corporate federal taxes in annual
reports filed with a stock exchange it was held that they were
entitled to inspect their own statements and that of another co-
conspirator who was chief accountant of the corporation made in
the course of a Securities and Exchange Commission investiga-
tion.238 But no inspection was allowed as to statements made to
the Internal Revenue Service and the F.B.I. The latest decision
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit calls for a liberal
construction of Rule 17(c).939
To summarize there have been decisions upholding the pos-
sibility of using Rule 17(c) to secure inspection of the defendant's
statements by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia and
by Judge Holtzoff of the District Court of the District of Columbia,
Judge Sylvester Ryan of the Southern District of New York, Judge
Rayfiel of the Eastern District of New York, and Judge Edward
P. Murphy of the Northern District of California. On the other
hand District Judges Goddard, Thomas F. Murphy, Irving Kauf-
man, and Herlands have opposed such discovery.
It has been seen that there have been several decisions per-
mitting discovery of the defendant's own statement under Rule
17(c), although there are also several opposing decisions.
What about discovery of the statements of witnesses? In the
first case on the subject it was held that a defendant charged with
conspiracy was not entitled to have produced a statement made by
a codefendant to a grand jury.2 40 Thus Rule 17(c) was not avail-
able to 6btain statements of witnesses. But in the next case on the
subject discovery was granted as to statements volunteered to the
23S United States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). The
decision was by District Judge Sylvester Ryan.239 United States v. O'Connor, 23 F.2d 466, 476 (2d Cir. 1956). Discov-
ery was also upheld in United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1948).
It is not clear from the statement of the court in either case whether defendant
sought discovery of his own statement or those of others.
240 United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 706-708 (W.D.La. 1949).
Oddly enough the cases on discovery of the defendant's own statements com-
menced in 1953, while those on the discovery of statements of others begin
in 1949.
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government by witnesses relating to the case.241 The written
statements of witnesses are "papers" and "documents" under Rule
17(c).2 42 Such statements are evidentiary when they might have
been introduced for impeachment purposes. But the statements of
"third persons" not otherwise identified are not prima facie evi-
dentiary; and the burden is on the defendant to show that they are
evidentiary.2 43 In another case discovery was deniied as to all
written statements of witnesses relative to the indictment, as the
defendant had failed to show that they were not otherwise
procurable by due diligence.2 " The court did not deny that dis-
covery would have lain if due diligence had been shown. District
Judge Holtzoff ruled that inspection should be denied as to state-
ments of potential adverse witnesses.245 The court asserted that
statements of witnesses are not admissible in evidence, nor may
they be used for impeachment purposes unless the witness is
actually called by the government.2 46 Some potential witnesses
are not called by the government at the trial. The defendant may
be adequately protected by making available to defense counsel
prior to cross-examination any written statement of a witness called
at the trial.2 47 The court asserted that a prior decision of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia was not controlling as it
involved a capital case in which a list of witnesses is required to
be furnished under statute.2 48 Moreover the decision was by a
three judge court, and was divided two to one; and even in civil
cases discovery was granted only on a showing of good cause. To
permit inspection might lead to "fabrication of countervailing
testimony, to intimidation of witnesses, to bribery of witnesses,
and other similar consequences."
Inspection of income tax returns and books and records of
third parties in the possession of the government has been de-
241 Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C.Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 885 (1953). The trial court refused discovery, but the court of appeals
reversed.
242 207 F.2d 136-137.
243 On the meaning of evidentiary materials see Note, 67 H.uiv. L. lzv.
492, 495-496 (1954);
244 United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 272-273 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
245 United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954). It seems ques-
tionable that the court followed the more liberal philosophy of Fryer v. United
States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
240 15 F.R.D. 869 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
247 Id. at 371.
248 Id. at 372. The case was Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C.
Cir. 1953).
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nied.2 49 The privilege of the statute against disclosure of confi-
dential information on such returns would prevail in the absence
of anything indicating that such persons would be called to testify
at the trial and because further application could be made, if
necessary, upon introduction of such evidence at the trial. The
doctrines of cases such as United States v. Andolsehelk250 as to
privileged matters applies only to the trial and not to the situa-
tion before trial.251 In the particular case the documents were not
relevant as yet. For the same reasons statements made by third
parties were not subject to inspection either.252 But the court did
order production of books and records of trucking companies
reflecting payments to corporate defendants, pointing out that
Rule 17(c) was designed on good cause shown to permit examina-
tion of voluminous records before trial to prepare the defense;
and that the indictment and bill of particulars was not fully
informative.
Edward P. Murphy of the Northern District of California
denied inspection of statements of witnesses signed or prepared
by them, and rejected the view of the Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia, citing an unreported case of his own dis-
trict.2 53 It made no difference that the case had been transferred
from the District of Columbia where inspection had been granted.
Edward Weinfeld, District Judge of the Southern District of New
York denied inspection of a statement of a codefendant as good
cause had not been shown.254 William J. Campbell, District Judge
of the Northern District of Illinois denied inspection of the written
statements of the government's prospective witnesses.2 55 While
249 United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
250 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
251 United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The
court pointed out that in United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78, 156
A.L.R. 387 (2d Cir. 1944), it was held that different rules may apply to pre-
trial production.
252 United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). The
decision in Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953), was thought
not to require inspection in all such cases, and to leave discretion to the trial
judge.
253 United States v. Bryson, 16 F.R.D. 431, 437 (N.D. Cal. 1954). Yet
at the same time he sustained inspection under Rule 16 following the District
of Columbia test.
254 United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). He cited
United States v. lozia, 13 F.R.D. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
255 United States v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286, 287-288 (N.D. Ill. 1955). The
court construed Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134 (D.C. Cir. 1953), as
applying only to capital cases.
9
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such a statement is a "document", it is not evidentiary as the
potential witness may not always be called at the trial. The Court
of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit denied inspection of written
statements of a postmaster, who was a witness for the defendant
at the trial, but not a witness for the government 2 -56 The statement
had no evidentiary value. Judge Thomas F. Murphy of the South-
ern District of New York denied inspection of witnesses' state-
ments.2 57 Such statements were not admissible in evidence as
required by the Bowman case. If they supported his testimony at
the trial they would be surplusage; if they impeached him, he would
not use them at the trial. Moreover good cause was not shown.
District Judge Leo F. Rayfiel of the Eastern District of New York
denied discovery of testimony of a codefendant and other before
the Superintendent of Banks of the State of New York.2 5 8 The
court pointed out that the transcripts were not evidentiary, were
not shown to be material to the preparation of the defense, and
would give the defendant access to the names and testimony of
possible government witnesses. It would be enough that the
transcripts were made available at the trial. In a prosecution of a
corporation and its officers for misstatement of corporate federal
taxes in annual reports fied with the stock exchange it was held by
Judge Sylvester Ryan of the Southern District of New York that
the defendants could not inspect statements made to the Internal
Revenue Service and the F.B.I. by thirteen coconspirators.25 9 There
was no indication that such coconspirators would testify at the
trial. If they did there might be inspection at the trial.
To summarize, the courts have rejected the right of the de-
fendant to secure inspection of the statements of witnesses under
Rule 17(c). Only the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
has permitted such inspection and District Judge Holtzoff has
given its interpretation a narrow meaning.
Draft violators claiming to be conscientious objectors have
sought discovery under Rule 17(c). In one case it was asserted
that when the validity of administrative procedure in a particular
case is under review in a criminal trial, the defendant's right to a
256 United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1955).
257 United States v. Kiamie, 18 F.R.D. 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). In this
case defendant sought the statement of his own witness. Most of the cases
involve statements of the government's witnesses, aside from the present case
and United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144 (7th Cir. 1955).
258 United States v. Kaskel, 18 F.R.D. 477, 481-482 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
250 United States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
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subpoena under Rule 17(c) may not be circumscribed.2 60 The
government must either disclose its information or in effect abandon
prosecution on the pending indictment. In a second case it was
held that the defendant would be granted a subpoena directed at
an F.B.I. report on which the Department of Justice based its
recommendation that the claim be rejected, so as to determine
whether there was such adverse information in the report as to
entitle the defendant to a resume of such report, but such report
having been made confidential by the attorney general's order,
the names and addresses of the informants would be deleted from
the report.2 61 In another case it was held that the defendant might
inspect and copy minutes of a hearing which he claimed would
disclose that he was not given a fair resume of adverse evidence
contained in the F.B.I. report used by the hearing officer, but would
not be permitted to inspect the F.B.I. report itself.262 If the de-
fendant wishes a summary of any adverse evidence contained in
the F.B.I. report he must request it seasonably.2 63 In close cases
the F.B.I. report should be produced at the trial to determine
whether the resume furnished the registrant is fair; but otherwise
it need not be produced even at the trial.2 64
A subpoena for inspection of all documents which the gov-
ernment had obtained from any person who is not party to the
proceeding will be denied.265 The court pointed out that the
defendant sought all but the "work product" of the government.
Likewise a subpoena for all documents obtained by the govern-
ment other than by seizure or process (1) in the course of the
grand jury investigation and (2) in the course of the government's
preparation for trial if (a) they were presented to the grand jury,
or (b) they are to be offered as evidence, was denied.266 This
20 United States v. Evans, 115 F. Supp. 340, 343 (D. Conn. 1953).
261 United States v. Stasevic, 117 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). But in
United States v. Dal Santo, 205 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 858 (1953), the court affirmed the ruling of the district court quash-
ing a subpoena to produce the F.B.I. report.
262 United States v. Wider, 117 F. Supp. 484, 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1954). The
court cited United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 5 (1953).
263 United States v. Bortlik, 119 F. Supp. 425, 427 (M.D. Pa. 1954);
United States v. De Lime, 121 F. Supp. 750, 755 (D.N.J. 1954).
264 United States v. De Lime, 121 F. Supp. 750, 756 (D.N.J. 1954). See
Davis, The Requirement of a Trial-Type Hearing, 70 HMv. L. BEv. 193, 243-
248 (1956).
205 United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D.
509 (D.D.C. 1949). See also United States v. Schine, 16 F.R.D. 514, 515
(W.D.N.Y. 1955).
266 United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
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amounted to an attempt to rummage around in the ifies of the
government. If the defendant proceeds with catch-all descriptions
he must at least list the evidentiary documents that are available
to him elsewhere and exclude them from those demanded of the
government2 67
A motion for production of all paper presented to the grand
jury has been denied.268 Secrecy of the grand jury may not be
violated either directly through inspection of the grand jury
minutes or indirectly by disclosure of the documentary evidence
presented to it.
Rule 17(c) does not permit discovery of the names of the
witnesses who appeared before the grand jury.2 69 Nor does it permit
discovery as to the names of witnesses who will appear at the trial
for the government.270 Nor does it permit an order directing the
government to aid the defendant in identifying the hand writing
or authorship of documents and papers properly subpoenaed.27 1
Rule 17(c) has been said to provide "a much narrower investi-
gatory scope than Rules 45(b) and 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."27 2 Nor may rule 17(c) be applied to secure the relief
allowed under Civil Rule 26 providing for taking depositions of
the opposite party, or under Civil Rule 83 providing for inter-
rogatories to the opposite party.273
Suppose the defendant is one of a group of defendants, all of
whom have been previously tried for the same offense. Should
this increase the right to discovery? In a prosecution under the
Smith Act a defendant who had been a fugitive was allowed wide
discovery.27 4 The district court directed the government to advise
counsel for the defendant which of the papers in evidence at a
267 United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United
States v. Giglio, 16 F.R.D. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
268 United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
260 United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 184 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
270 Ibid. United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405, 409 (S.D. Cal.
1952). See United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
271 United States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
272 United States v. Long, 15 F.R.D. 25, 28 (D. Puerto Rico, 1953).
273 United States v. Schluter, 19 F.R.D. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See Note,
60 YALE L.J. 626, 642-644 (1951).
274 United States v. Stein, 18 F.R.D. 17, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But material
disclosing the identity of informers was excepted from the order.
See in accord United States v. Stein, 140 F. Supp. 761, 765 (D.D.N.Y.
1956), granting similar relief to other defendants prosecuted under the Smith
Act
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previous trial of the other defendants it is the present intention to
introduce at the trial of this defendant as part of its direct case.
Furthermore if subsequently before trial the government deter-
mines to introduce other like material, the government is to
advise counsel for the defendant of such data and furnish it to him.
Suppose the defendant seeks documents to be used by the
prosecution for rebuttal or impeachment purposes. Inspection has
been denied as this would not aid the preparation of defendant's
case except in a negative way.2 75 Furthermore the prosecution
cannot determine until the defendant has introduced evidence what
if any rebuttal or impeachment will be called for. Surprise here is
unavoidable and keeps both sides within the confines of the truth.
Suppose the defendant seeks documents containing confiden-
tial matter protected by executive orders and regulations?2 70 One
case referred to the problem and pointed out that the instant case
did not involve such a situation.277 In another case the govern-
ment raised the issue by way of defense to a motion, but the
court ruled for the government on other grounds.278 In a sub-
sequent case the court denied inspection, distinguishing pre-trial
procedure from procedure at the trial.2 7 9
An application for a subpoena as to papers which were the
property of federal departments and appeared to be of a confiden-
tial nature and which related to a witness whom the defendant
anticipated would be a witness in behalf of the government was
denied as premature where the records might not be relevant
275 United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405, 410 (S.D. Cal.
1952). See also United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 59, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v.
Schine, 16 F.R.D. 514, 516 (W.D.N.Y. 1954). But compare Fryer v. United
States, 207 F.2d 134, 137 (D.C. Cir. 1953), regarding them as evidentiary
under the Bowman case, with United States v. Carter, 15 F.B.D. 367, 369(D.D.C. 1954), which states that "at most" the rule is that wide.
276 See Note, 47 Nw. U. L. BEv. 519 (1952); Berger and Krash, Govern-
ment Immunity From Discovery, 59 YALE L.J. 1451, 1456-1460 (1950); Par-
sons v. State, 251 Ala. 467, 38 So. 2d 209 (1948).
277 United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405, 407 (S.D. Cal.
1952).
278 United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
279 United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57, 59-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). In
several cases it had been held that if inspection is refused even at the trial, the
prosecution must be dismissed. United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503,
506 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Beckman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir.
1946); United States v. Grayson, 166 F.2d 862, 870 (2d Cir. 1948); Christoffel
v. United States, 200 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1952). See Note, 58 YALE
L.J. 993 (1949).
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upon the trial or the use thereof might become academic in view
of action taken by the trial court.280
Suppose the defendant seeks documents which identify con-
fidential informers. It has been held that inspection will not be
permitted.28' The court pointed out that under 18 U.S.C. section
3482 only persons charged with treason or other capital offenses
are entitled to names of witnesses who will be produced at the
trial.282 Hence in noncapital cases even if informers are certain
to be produced at the trial, inspection will be denied as the gov-
ernment might elect not to use the documents rather than reveal
the identity of the informers. But disclosure may be allowed where
identity of the informer appears essential to the defense. Denial
of inspection would not preclude further application for inspection
during the trial. Even if such documents had been presented to
the grand jury, no inspection would be permitted because of the
additional public policy favoring secrecy of grand jury proceed-
ings.28 The documents withheld by the trial court from inspec-
tion and not offered in evidence at the trial may be sealed by the
government and filed with the clerk to remain secret pending
further order.284 If the defendant appeals they may be made part
of the record on appeal for inspection by the court of appeal to
enable it to determine whether inspection was wrongly denied.
A subsequent case also denied inspection which would identify
informers.285
The first decision construing Rules 17 and 17(c) together
stated that Rule 17(c) is simply conplementary to Rule 16 in pro-
viding for subpoena addressed to the party having possession of
280 United States v. Hiss, 9 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). The subpoena
had been issued to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service.
The government's motion to quash was granted.
The decision pointed out that Judge Bondy had previously denied the
government's motion to quash a subpoena to the State Department for papers
concerning Whittaker Chambers who was definitely to be a witness at the trial.
Chief Justice Marshall suggested that "state reasons" might warrant denial
of enforcement of a subpoena in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 35, 37
(C.C.D. Va. 1807).
281 United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Cal. 1952),
7 MIAMI L.Q. 118 (1952). Here the government's motion to modify the sub-
poena was granted.
282 104 F. Supp. 409.
283 Id. at 410.
284 Id. at 410-411.
285 United States v. Stein, 17 F.R.D. 17, 19-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). The
court will sit in camera to consider the issue.
See also United States v. Stasevic, 117 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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the documents, to produce them.286  The court determined that
under neither rule could a defendant have discovery of a state-
ment made by a codefendant to the grand jury.
The courts early made it clear that precedents should not be
set "whereby defendants could promiscuously seek subpoenas
under Rule 17(c) . . . which the clerk issues without question,
and ex parte orders for the production and inspection of con-
fidential records, which either might not be relevant upon the
trial or the use of which might become academic in view of action
taken by the trial court."287
In 1949 Judge Holtzoff stated that the purpose of Rule 17(c)
is a 'limited one." It is "to make it possible to require the produc-
tion before the trial of documents subpoenaed for use at the
trial." Its purpose is "merely to shorten the trial" as the documents
are examined before trial. And it is "not intended as a discovery
provision."288 Criminal procedure does not permit the broad dis-
covery allowed in civil actions.
In a case which later went up to the Supreme Court the Court
of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit held that Rule 17(c) was .not
intended to authorize discovery and inspection expressly prohibited
by Rule 16.289 The federal district court had denied the motion
of the government to quash the subpoena. The court of appeals
reversed this denial. The subpoena had been directed to the chief
of the midwest office of the Anti-Trust Division of the Department
of Justice. He had declined to comply under the advice and
instruction of the Attorney General. The district court found him
guilty of contempt of court and committed him to the custody
of the Attorney General. The court felt that the drafters of the
rule did not intend to authorize discovery under Rule 17(c)
"expressly prohibited by Rule 16."290 It did not make sense "to
create in Rule 17(c) an almost unlimited right of discovery by
286 United States v. Brumfield, 85 F. Supp. 696, 697 (W.D. La. 1949).
For discussion of the relation of Rule 17(c) to Rule 16 see Note, 67 HAMv.
L. Rzv. 492, 494-498 (1954).
2S7 United States v. Hiss, 9 F.R.D. 515, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
2s8 United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D.
509, 510 (D.D.C. 1949). The court pointed out that the subpoena in the in-
stant case was "not intended to secure evidence to be introduced at the trial,"
which the court implied would be a proper purpose.
289 United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 185 F.2d 159 (7th Cir. 1950).
The case was noted in 64 Hnv. L. REv. 1011 (1951).
290 185 F.2d 168. But it is not accurate to say that Rule 16 "expressly
prohibited" other discovery. It was simply silent as to other discovery.
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use of the subpoena provisions." The court referred to a prior deci-
sion which seemed to authorize a subpoena broad in scope, but
construed this decision as simply holding that'a court of appeals
would not grant mandamus against the district court.29' Chief
Judge Major in a' concurring opinion stated that Rule 17(c) im-
posed no obligation on either the defendant or the government
or their attorneys. 292 The word "person" in Rule 17(c) referred to
one subpoenaed as a witness, and not to the parties.2 93 Rule 17(c)
unlike Rule 16 did not use the language "attorney for the govern-
ment." A wide construction of Rule 17(c) would render Rule 16
meaningless. "Why bother to go into court and obtain an order
directing the government to make the limited production required
under Rule 16 when much more can be obtained merely by filling
in the blank space of a subpoena as provided for in Rule 17?"294
Circuit Judge Lindley dissented on the ground that the majority
of the court had read Rule 17(c) out of the books and completely
deleted it.29 5 Rule 17(c) adds the innovation that the documents
subpoenaed may be produced prior to trial for inspection. It
should make no difference that the person who has the documents
is an attorney, whether a government attorney or even the de-
fendant's attorney.296 But he recognized that relief under Rule
17(c) is discretionary with the trial court. Since the appellant
did not contend that the discretion had been abused, there was
no issue before the court of appeals.
On certiorari the United States Supreme Court vacated the
judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the
district court.2 97 The Supreme Court held that under Rule 17(c)
any document or other material which had been obtained by the
291 Id. at 164. The prior decision was United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d
642 (2d Cir. 1948).
292 185 F.2d 164.
203 Id. at 165.
204 Id. at 166. But this overlooks the right of the government to move to
quash the subpoena.
20 Id. at 167.
206 When this case went to the Supreme Court Rule 17(c) was construed
as applying to all persons including the parties and their attorneys. Civil Rule
45(b) has been similarly construed. Note, 67 HAXv. L. REv. 492, 495 n.19
(1954).2 07 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951). Justice
Black would affirm the district court which had allowed discovery and found
the government attorney guilty of contempt of court. Justice Clark took no part
in the case. The case is noted in 25 So. CAriF. L. 11:v. 137 (1951); 42 J. Crtmi.
L., C. & P. S. 774, 778 (1952).
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government by solicitation, or voluntarily from third persons, and
which is admissible in evidence, is subject to subpoena. The
materials thus subpoenaed need not actually be used in evidence
if a good-faith effort is made to obtain evidence; and the court
may control the use of Rule 17(c) to that end by its power to
rule on a motion to quash or modify. The court should be solicitious
to protect against disclosures of the identity of informants and the
methods, manner and circumstances of the government acquisi-
tion of the materials. Since one clause of the subpoena was too
broad, the government attorney could not be held in contempt
for refusal to comply with the subpoena. Justice Minton, speaking
for the court stated:
"It would be strange indeed if the defendant discovered
some evidence by the use of Rule 16 which the Government
was not going to introduce and yet could not require its pro-
duction by Rule 17(c). There may be documents and other
materials in the possession of the Government not subject to
Rule 16. No good reason appears why they may not be reached
by subpoena under Rule 17(c) as long as they are evidentiary.
That is not to say that the materials thus subpoenaed must
actually be used in evidence. It is only required that a good-
faith effort be made to obtain evidence. The court may con-
trol the use of Rule 17(c) to that end by its power to rule on
motions to quash or modify.
"It was not intended by Rule 16 to give a limited right of
discovery, and then by Rule 17 to give a right of discovery in
the broadest terms. ... Rule 17(c) was not intended to pro-
vide an additional means of discovery. Its chief innovation
was to expedite the trial by providing a time and place before
trial for the inspection of the subpoenaed documents ...
However, the plain words of the Rule may not be ignored.
They must be given their ordinary meaning to carry out the
purpose of establishing a more liberal policy for the produc-
tion, inspection and use of the materials at the trial. There
was no intention to exclude from the reach of process of the
defendant any material that had been used before the grandjury or could be used at the trial. In short, any document or
other materials, admissible as evidence, obtained by the Gov-
ernment by solicitation or voluntarily from third persons is
subject to subpoena."298
The Bowman case may be thought not to be a strong holding
as it might have been decided on the narrow basis of defect in the
subpoena. 299 But a number of writers have construed the case as
298 341 U.S. 214, 219-221 (1951).
299 Note, 25 So. CAL F. L. REv. 37 (1951).
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sanctioning the use of Rule 17(c) as a discovery provision.300 With
this latter approach the author of this article concurs.
Following the Bowman case it became quite common for a
defendant to move under both Rules 16 and 17(c).301 Out of
abundant caution defendants have adopted a "dragnet practice."302
In some cases the defendant moves under these two rules and also
for a bill of particulars under Rule 7(f).303 Although these three
rules "have different functions and applications, they serve a re-
lated purpose: to enable the accused to meet the charges presented
against him. They should be liberally interpreted to carry out
their purpose." 04
The Bowman case was thought to contain "somewhat con-
flicting statements" by the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia.30 5 The latter court preferred to follow that part of the
Bowman view "which leads to the fullest presentation of facts and
away from the notion of a trial as a game of combat by surprise."
Hence the written statements of the defendant and of witnesses
fall within its scope. The words "papers" and "documents" in
Rule 17(c) embrace such written statements.3 0 8 A statement of
the defendant which was introduced in evidence and statements
by witnesses which might have been introduced for impeachment
purposes are "evidentiary" as required by the Bowman Case; but
this is not true as to statements of "third persons" who are not
otherwise identified.
It was thought that under the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Bowman case the trial court should uphold a subpoena for
"all books, documents, paper, materials and objects which (a) have
been presented to the grand jury, or (b) are to be offered as
300 Notes, 65 HARv. L. REv. 107, 172-173 (1951); 25 So. CALWF. L.
lhv. 137 (1951); 60 Y.E L.J. 626, 629 (1951). But see Note, 67 HAav.
L. REv. 492, 496 (1954).
301 United States v. Kidwell, 14 F.R.D. 399, 400 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
302 United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); United
States v. Giglio, 16 F.R.D. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
303 United States v. O'Connor, 237 F.2d 466, 475 (2d Cir. 1956).
304 Id. at 476.
305 Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 184, 136 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Wilbur K.
Miller, J., dissented.
300 The court pointed out that in Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414,
418 (1953), the Supreme Court included written statements by a prosecution
witness within the ordinary meaning of the word "document."
18
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 4 [1957], Art. 5
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol59/iss4/5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
evidence at the trial", if the motion represented a good faith effort
to obtain evidence.307
The Bowman Case was construed by District Judge Dimock
as holding that Rule 17(c) provides for the production of material
which because neither obtained from or belonging to the de-
fendant nor obtained from other by seizure or by process may
not be obtained from the government under Rule 16.308 This
leaves for the subject of Rule 17(c) material obtained by the
government by solicitation or voluntarily from third persons, as
stated in the Bowman case; and "material which has been in the
government's possession from the time of its origin."
What were the views of the Advisory Committee on Rule
17(c) as a means of discovery? Most of the committee have not
expressed themselves in print. Chief Justice Vanderbilt, a chair-
man of the Advisory Committee, in construing a New Jersey rule
similar to Rule 17(c) upheld the principle that discovery of a
confession was addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
court.309 Judge Holtzoff, secretary of the Advisory Committee,
did not regard Rule 17(c) as a means of discovery.310 Rather it is
limited to requiring production before trial of documents sub-
poenaed for use at the trial in the interest of time. The late Pro-
fessor George H. Dession has stated that Rule 17(c) was to
provide a "subpoena practice which permits for a sifting in advance
of trial of the documents actually to be offered in evidence."31'
Professor Lester B. Orfield has stated a similar view.312 G. Aaron
Youngquist has left the question open.313
While Rule 17(c) unlike Rule 16 contains no language call-
ing for a showing by the defendant of materiality and reasonable-
307 United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.D.R. 180, 184 (W.D. Pa. 1952). The
court found no good faith and denied inspection.
308 United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
See the summaries in 84 NEB. L. REv. 645, 657-658 (1955); 60 YALE L.J.
626, 629 (1951); 67 HAEV. L. REv. 492, 497-498 (1954).
309 State v. Cicennia, 6 N.J. 296, 78 A.2d 568, 570 (1951). But compare
his decision in State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 885 (1951).
310 United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D.
509, 510 (D.D.C. 1949). See also United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 869
(D.D.C. 1954).
311 Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure II, 56 YALE
L.J. 197, 222 (1947).312 Orfield, The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 26 NEB. L. REv.
570, 588-589 (1947).
313 NEW Yore: UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAw; INSTrrUTE PROCEEDINGS 167-168
(1946).
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ness it has been construed as requiring a showing of good cause.314
To show good cause the defendant must show four things: (1) that
the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that they are
not otherwise procurable by the defendant reasonably in advance
of trial by the exercise of due diligence; (3) that defendant cannot
properly prepare for trial and that trial may be delayed unless
there is inspection; and (4) that the application is made in good
faith.
Suppose the defendant fails to specify the paper with suffi-
cient particularity, but the government fails to move the quash. It
has been held that then the government must produce the papers
at the hearing for such use as the court may deem proper.315
In some cases the government in response to a subpoena has
agreed to furnish the papers and objects sought to the defendant.316
Defendant is then given an opportunity to cull out the particular
items he wishes to inspect. If the government then objects to
inspection of particular items and the parties cannot agree, the
court will hear the parties and issue an appropriate order.
When accountants representing persons accused of income
tax evasion had been given free access to records in the possession
of the government prior to filing of indictment, the district court
in its discretion might refuse inspection under Rule 17(c).317
Inspection has been denied when the defendant already has the
information sought and seeks only its confirmation or to be able
to meet any disparity. 1 8
A trial court does not commit reversible error in refusing to
enforce a subpoena for the minutes book of a congressional com-
mittee when it appears that the minutes denied were not in the
book sought by the subpoena.3 19
314 United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). See in
accord, United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). United
States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
Chief Justice Marshall laid down a requirement of materiality in United
States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 86 (C.C.D. Va. 1807).
Thus there may be difference between pre-trial and a trial subpoena. Note,
67 HAMv. L. REv. 492, 496-497 (1954).
315 United States v. Lipshitz, 18 F.R.D. 102, 104 (D.D.N.Y. 1953). Where
the government objects there should be a showing of specificity. Note, 67
HARv. L. REv. 492, 497 (1954).
316 United States v. Silverman, 132 F. Supp. 820, 833 (D. Conn. 1955).
31 7 Remmer v. United States, 205 F.2d 277, 284 (9th Cir. 1953).
318 United States v. Schine, 16 F.R.D. 514, 515 (W.D.N.Y. 1955).
319 Christoffel v. United States, 200 F.2d 734, 739 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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If the subpoena is good in part and bad in part, the govern-
ment attorney may not be held in contempt for refusal to comply
with it.320 It is not for the person facing punishment to call the
good from the bad.
Where the subpoena is addressed to the United States attor-
ney the district court has no authority to issue an order to the
Department of Agriculture to obey such subpoena even though
the United States attorney disclaims possession of the documents
sought.321
Whether the trial court should grant relief under Rule 17(c)
has been said to be discretionary. 322 The rule uses the word
"may" not "shall". 323 Furthermore, the court may quash where
compliance is unreasonable or oppressive.
In a case decided by the Municipal Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia it was pointed out that under Rule 17 a
party is entitled to receive from the clerk of court a subpoena
duces tecum signed and sealed, but otherwise blank, and per-
mitted to fill it in without submission to or permission from the
court.32 4 Then on timely motion the subpoena may be quashed
if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive.32  This
method is employed because of the inherent difficulty of deter-
mining the relevancy or competency of evidence in advance of
actual production in court.
At what time may the defendant move for a subpoena under
Rule 17(c)? It was held in one case that the motion is premature
where the sufficiency of the indictment has not been tested by a
320 Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 221 (1951).
321 United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
322 United States v. Bowman Dairy Co., 185 F.2d 159, 166, 167 (7th Cir.
1950); United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405, 408 (S.D. Cal. 1952);
United States v. Mesarosh, 13 F.R.D. 180, 184 (W.D. Pa. 1952); United States
v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Remmer v. United States, 205
F.2d 277, 284 (9th Cir. 19538; United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 867, 368
(D.D.C. 1954); United States v. Scully, 15 F.R.D. 402 (S.D.N.Y. 1954);
United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). But compare
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 85, No. 14,692d (C.C.D. Va. 1807);
State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687, 698 (1936).
323 United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367, 368 (D.D.C. 1954).
324 Kelly v. United States, 73 A.2d 232, 234 (1950). This would be done
under Rule 17(a).
325 This would be done under Rule 17<c).
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motion to dismiss. 3826 The motion should be filed and entertained
only when the case is ready or has already been set for trial. In
another case it was held that a motion for discovery under Rule
17(c) was premature in view of the defendant's motion for a bill
of particulars under Rule 7(f) and for discovery under Rule 16;
but the motion should remain on the calendar until ruling on the
other motions.3 27
At what time may the government move to quash or modify a
subpoena? One opinion was asserted that it may be made only
after an information or indictment has been returned.8 28 It will
be recalled that a defendant seeking discovery under Rule 16 may
do so only after filing of the indictment or information. It has
been pointed out that the motion to quash under Rule 17(c) must
be "made promptly." 2 9
Suppose a district court grants defendant's motion under
Rule 17(c). May the government secure a writ of mandamus
from the court of appeals? It was held that it may not as the
order is interlocutory and not directly appealable.330
What about an immediate appeal from a denial by the trial
court of inspection under Rule 17(c)? In New Jersey where there
is a similar rule appeal was denied on the ground that the order
of the trial court was interlocutory.88' There are no decisions
permitting immediate relief by mandamus from the court of
appeals to the district court.382
Suppose ihe court of appeals finds that the denial of discovery
was prejudicial. Is this a ground for reversal? In one case the
320 United States v. Long, 15 F.R.D. 25, 27 (D. Puerto Rico 1953). but
Chief Justice Marshall held in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, No.
14,692d (C.C.D. Va. 1807), that a subpoena may issue before arraignment.
See Note, 67 H Av. L. REv. 492, 499 (1954).
327 United States v. Parr, 17 F.R.D. 512, 516 (S.D. Tex. 1955).
328 In re Investigation of World Arrangements, etc., 13 F.R.D. 280, 283
(D.D.C. 1952). Here it was the government which applied for the subpoena,
and the corporation investigated moved to quash or modify.
329 Taylor v. United States, 221 F.2d 809, 810 (6th Cir. 1955). In this
case the government applied for a subpoena in a grand jury investigation.
330 United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1948). The court cited
Cogen v. United States, 278 U.S. 221, 224 (1929), in which the Court stated
that an order on an application for a subpoena duces tecum is interlocutory.
But see United States v. United States District Court, 288 F.2d 713 (4th Cir.
1956.)
331 State v. Cicenia, 9 N.J. Super. 135, 75 A.2d 476, 478 (1950).
332 Compare Moder v. United States, 62 F.2d 462, 464 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
Mandamus for the government was denied in United States v. Bondy, 171 F.2d
642, 643 (2d Cir. 1948).
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court of appeals directed that the defendant be given discovery
and a right to move for new trial, the district court then to grant a
new trial if prejudice was shown.333 If the district court then
denied a new trial, the court of appeals would then reverse only
for abuse of discretion.
VIII. Discovery Not Specifically Authorized by Rules 16 and 17(c).
Suppose it be assumed that discovery under Rules 16 and 17(c)
is rather narrow in scope. Does that preclude the federal courts
from granting discovery in cases not covered by Rule 16 and
17(c)? In the opinion of the author it does not. Five impressive
arguments may be advanced in favor of liberal discovery.
In the first place a court has inherent power to order discovery.
As early as 1928 it was asserted that only a minority of the state
courts deny judicial power to order discovery. 3 4 Twenty-five years
later it was pointed out that the "majority of states, although with-
out statute or rule of court on the subject, allow discovery in
criminal cases at the discretion of the trial court." 3 5 Many state
courts have expressly relied on the doctrine of inherent power, 36
and occasionally on constitutional rights of the defendant.88 7 The
doctrine of inherent power was applied in a decision of the Court
of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit. 8 The Supreme Court has
relied on the doctrine of inherent power in a case where the
United States attorney was unwilling to return books and papers
acquired by illegal search and seizure.839 An order for physical
examination of the prosecuting witness in a rape case has been
333 Fryer v. United States, 207 F.2d 134, 138 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
3 3 4 Note, 41 -ARv. L. REv. 519 (1928). See also Note, 88 J. CriM. L. &
CRRMINOILOGY 249, 251-252 (1947).
335 Note, 53 COLUm. L. REv. 1161 (1953).
336 State ex rel. Wagner v. Circuit Court, 60 S.D. 115, 244 N.W. 100, 101
(1932); People v. Rogas, 158 Misc. 567, 287 N.Y. Supp. 1005, 1007-1008
(King's County Ct. 1936); People v. Skoyec, 183 Misc. 764, 50 N.Y.S.2d 438,
440 (Sup. Ct. 1944); State v. Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, 302 P.2d
263, 265 (Ariz. 1956). The Arizona case is very significant as Arizona had a
rule of court modeled on Federal Rule 16, yet relief was given on the theory
of inherent power.
337 Discovery was held allowable on the basis of the presumption of inno-
cence and the right to a fair trial under the state and federal constitutions.
State v. Dorsey, 207 La. 928, 22 So. 2d 273, 285 (1945), favorably noted in
20 TuL. L. Ruv. 133 (1945). The right to compulsory process was stressed in
State ex rel. Brown v. Dewell, 123 Fla. 785, 167 So. 687, 690 (1936).
338 Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 845, 11 A.L.R.2d 635 (8th Cir.
1949). See Notes, 64 Hv. L. REv. 1011, 1013 (1951); 67 HARV. L. REv.
492, 498 (1954). See also United States v. Peace, 16 F.R.D. 423 (S.D.N.Y.
1954).
339 Wise v. Henkel, 220 U.S. 556, 558 (1911).
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supported on the theory of inherent power.3 40 An order for an
autopsy has been supported on that ground.3 41 Inspection of
chattels has been allowed in civil cases on the theory of inherent
power.8 42 Although the Supreme Court rejected a rule on pre-
trial conference, it has been asserted that such procedure may be
used in criminal cases. 43 The doctrine of inherent power is
supported by writers such as Wigmore.344 The considerable dis-
covery allowed before the adoption of the federal criminal rules
doubtless was based on inherent power.345
In the second place the courts have supervisory powers over
public officers. As early as 1928 it was suggested that "an adequate
basis for the sustaining of such a power could always be found in
the supervisory control that courts exercise over public officers."3 46
This conclusion was based on the statement of Chief Justice
Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals in 1927. "The power
frequently asserted to compel the return of property illegally
impounded is based upon the assumption of a supervisory juris-
diction over the acts of public prosecutors. . . . There may be
something of kinship here to the power to compel inspection in
furtherance of justice."347 Under Federal Criminal Rule 41(c) a
340 People v. Preston, 19 Cal. App. 675, 127 Pac. 660, 664 (1912). Like-
wise in civil cases. City of South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 60 N.E. 271,
274 (1901).
341 Gray v. State, 55 Tex. Cr. 90, 114 S.W. 635, 648, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 513
(1908); Dennis v. State, 279 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tenn. 1955), 24 TENN. L. REv.
385 (1956).
342 Notes, 26 N.C.L. REv. 398, 399 n.10 (1948); 23 IND. L.J. 333, 335
n.15 (1948).
34 3 Barron, in 6 NEw YORK UNrmRsrrY SCHOOL OF LAW INSTITUTE PRO-
cEEDNcs 268-269 (1946); CLARK, CODE PLEADINr 574 n.276 (1947); ORFmELD,
C tmINAL PROCEDURE FRom ARREST TO APPEAL 323-324 (1947); Lederle,
Progress in Judicial Administration, 37 J. Am. JuD. Soc'y 82, 85 (1953).
This analogy is very important as pre-trial procedure is closely related to
discovery.
344 6 WiGmoE, EvwFNCE 395 (1940).
345 67 HAnv. L. REV. 492, 493 (1954). There are numerous other exam-
ples of inherent power. A federal trial court has inherent power to order the
taking of a deposition on behalf of the defendant, United States v. Dockery,
50 F. Supp. 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1943); to appoint a master, referee or auditor,
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1923); to grant change of venue to a
criminal defendant, Crocker v. justice of Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 175,
94 N.E. 369 (1911); to vacate a conviction at any time upon constitutional
grounds, State v. Magrum, 76 N.D. 527, 38 N.W.2d 358 (1949).
340 Note, 41 HAuv. L. REv. 519, 520 (1928).
347 People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 30, 156 N.E. 84,
85-86, 52 A.L.R. 200 (1927). The court cited a case on search and seizure.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). See also Wise v. Henkel,
220 U.S. 556 (1911); United States v. Mills, 185 Fed. 318 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911); United States v. McHie, 194 Fed. 894, 898 (N.D. Ill. 1912).
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defendant may move before trial to compel return of property
obtained by an illegal search and seizure.
In the third place discovery should be available under
Criminal Rule 26 which provides: "The admissibility of evidence
and the competency and privilege of witnesses shall be governed,
except when an act of Congress or these rules otherwise provide,
by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and
experience." Thus the federal courts are empowered to develop
modern progressive rules of evidence.348 Discovery may well be
treated under the heading of evidence as well as practice. The
leading treatises on evidence all give attention to discovery in
criminal cases as well as in civil.349 In a number of states there
are statutes which provide that the rules of evidence of civil cases
shall, so far as applicable, be applied in criminal cases.8 50 These
statutes have several times been construed as allowing discovery
in criminal cases.351 A decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has seen this possibility in a case involving pro-
duction and inspection at trial. Circuit Judge Lindley stated:
"Rule 17(c) providing for a subpoena duces tecum does not of
itself answer any of these inquiries, for it does not in so many
words exclude other procedure. Rule 26 admonishes us to pro-
ceed in accord with the principles of the common law, in the
light of reason and experience."352
In the fourth place discovery may be available under Criminal
Rule 57(b) which provides: "If no procedure is specifically
provided by rule, the court may proceed in any lawful manner
34s See McCoIVrCK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 141, 145
(1954).
.34 6 WIGMORE, EyiDENcE § § 1845, 1847, 1850-55, 1859(g) and 1863
(1940); 8 id. § 2224; McCorMIcc, EVIDENCE 210; 2 WHARTON, CRMUNAL Evi-
DENCE § 671 (1955).
350 Note, 39 CoLUm. L. REV. 287, 289 (1939).
35' State v. Hall, 55 Mont. 182, 175 Pac. 267 (1918); State v. Jeffries, 117
Kan. 742, 232 Pac. 873, 874 (1925), dissenting opinion of two judges; State
v. Fox, 133 Ohio St. 154, 12 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1938); Application of Hughes,
41 N.Y.S.2d 843, 847 (Sup. Ct. King's County 1943); State v. Leland, 140 Ore.
598, 227 P.2d 785, 793 (1951). While leaving the question open, Cardozo, C.J.,
pointed out that the rules of discovery are closely akin to rules of evidence, as
they govern and define the remedies whereby evidence is made available. Peo-
ple ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court, 245 N.Y. 24, 154 N.E. 84, 86, 52 A.L.R.
200 (1927).
352 United States v. Gordon, 196 F.2d 886, 888 (7th Cir. 1952).
In Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S. 718, 720-721 (1885), the Supreme Court seems
to have regarded a New York discovery statute as laying down a rule of evi-
dence.
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not inconsistent with these rules or with any applicable statute."
This rule seems to empower the courts to follow common law
precedents not written into the rules and to preserve the inherent
power of the courts to develop the law. 53 There have been a
number of concrete examples of this since the adoption of the
rules. The rules are silent as to inspection of documents during the
trial. Before the adoption of the rules the courts granted motions
for inspection at the trial.354 After the rules went into effect the
Supreme Court held erroneous the denial of a motion for produc-
tion and inspection at the trial.8 55 Rule 20 provides for waiver
of venue when the defendant pleads guilty. No rule provides for
such waiver when the defendant pleads not guilty. Yet both before
and after the adoption of the rules waiver of venue has been
allowed even when the defendant pleads not guilty. 56 Rule 29
is silent as to directed verdicts or judgments of acquittal im-
mediately after the opening statement of the United States at-
torney. Yet both before and after the adoption of the rules such
a directed verdict has been permitted.8 57
In the fifth place discovery may be available under the "all
writs" section of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. section 1651(a),
which provides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate
in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law." In 1941 the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit relied on this provision with respect to pre-trial
discovery. 58 It was under this section that it was held that the
writ of error coram nobis was available in federal criminal cases
by the United States Supreme Court.8 59
353 Note, 67 HARv. L. Rxv. 492, 499 (1954).
354 United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 1944).
355 Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953).
356 Orfield, Venue of Federal Criminal Cases, 17 U. PiTT. L. REv. 375,
389-393 (1956). Moreover the prerequisites for waiver under Rule 20 such
as a statement in writing by the defendant and the approval of the United
States attorney for each district are not insisted on, or even mentioned in the
decisions.
357 Orfield, Motion for Acquittal in Federal Criminal Procedure: Successor
to Directed Verdict, 28 TEmP. L.Q. 400, 407 (1955); United States v. Maryland
Cooperative Milk Co., 145 F. Supp. 151, 152 (D.D.C. 1956).
38 Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. v. NLRB, 120 F.2d 126, 127 (1st Cir.
1941). This theory is supported in a note, Subpoenaed Documents in Federal
Criminal Cases, 51 YALE L.J. 687, 690 (1942).
359 United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954). Yet the only prior opin-
ion relying on this statute was the concurring opinion of Biggs, J., in United
States v. Steese, 144 F.2d 439, 442 (3d Cir. 1944).
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IX. Discovery Under the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The American Law Institute Code of Criminal Procedure
contains no provisions on discovery. But the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure drafted by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws provides for more full discovery
than the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Rule 28 entitled
"Discovery and Inspection" provides:
"U pon motion of a defendant, at any time after the
filing of the indictment or information, and upon a showing
that the items sought may be material to the preparation of
his defense and that the request is reasonable, te court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers,
documents or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging
to the defendant or obtained from others, including written
statements or confessions made by the defendant or a co-
defendant [and written statements of witnesses]. The order
shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspec-
tion and of taking copies or photographs and may prescribe
such terms and conditions as are just."3 60
The annotation pointed out that this rule is modeled on Fed-
eral Criminal Rule 16 which does not specifically include state-
ments by the defendant or by others.3 6 ' The federal criminal
rule was too narrow. The uniform rule did not adopt a sugges-
tion that the rule should be narrowed by limiting inspection to
items admissible in evidence.3 62 The annotation pointed out that
Maryland Supreme Court Rule 5 allows inspection of statements
made by the defendant. It will be noted that the uniform rule
states that the court "shall order" discovery whereas Federal
Criminal Rule 16 provides that it "may order" discovery. The
uniform rule provides for discovery as to objects obtained "from
others" without any limitation "by seizure or by process" as in
Federal Criminal Rule 16.
Rule 29(c) of the uniform rules, entitled "Inspection of Docu-
mentary Evidence and Objects," provides: "The court may order
that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the sub-
360 See Notes, 42 J. Cum. L., C. & P.S., 774, 778-779 (1952); 20
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1140, 1141 (1954).
361 The annotation cited as in accord Freed, The Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure: An Appraisal, 33 A.B.A.J. 1010 (1947); Dession, The New York Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure II, 56 YALE L.J. 197 (1947).
362 Compare Berge, Proposed Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 42
MicH. L. REv. 353 (1943).
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poena be produced before the court at a time prior to the trial
or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and
may upon their production permit such books, papers, documents
or objects or portions thereof to be inspected and copies thereof
to be made by the parties and their attorneys." This was modeled
on the last sentence of Federal Criminal Rule 17(c).
Chief Justice Marshall has stated that if it is not apparent
that the papers sought by the defendant are immaterial to the
case or involve "state reasons," "if they may be important in the
defense, if they may be safely read at the trial, would it not be a
blot in the page which records the judicial proceedings of this
country, if, in a case of such serious import as this, the accused
would be denied the use of them."3 63 He also stated: "Might I
be permitted to utter one sentiment, with respect to myself, it
would be to deplore, most earnestly, the occasion which should
compel me to look back on any part of my official conduct with
so much self-reproach as I should feel, could I declare, on the
information now possessed, that the accused is not entitled to the
letter in question, if it should be really important to him."3 64 In
the words of Justice Brennan speaking as a member of the New
Jersey Supreme Court: "Surely we have come a long way since
the day when Mr. Justice Cardozo was able to discern only 'The
beginnings or at least the glimmerings' of a 'power in courts of
criminal jurisdiction to compel the discovery of documents in
furtherance of justice.'"365
363 United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 30, 35, No. 14,692d (C.C.D. Va.
1807).
&64 Id. at 37.
305 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 896 (1953).
Compare also Millar, The Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 11 J.
Canr. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 344, 350-351, 353-355 (1920), with Orfield, The
Modernization of Criminal Procedure, 5 JouRNAL OF TBE Missoutu BAR 220,
202-203 (1949).
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APPENDIX
LAW REviFw COMMENTS ON DISCOVERY
41 HARv. L. REV. 519 (1928)
7 ForDHAM L. REv. 449 (1938)
39 COLurM. L. REv. 287 (1939)
51 YALE L.J. 687 (1942)
20 TULANE L. lRv. 133 (1945)
38 J. CrIM. L. 249 (1947)
53 DICK. L. REv. 301 (1949)
41 J. CrIM. L. 64 (1950)
64 HArtv. L. REv. 1011 (1951)
25 So. CALIF. L. REv. 137 (1951)
60 YALE L.J. 626 (1951)
42 J. CpM. L. 365 (1951) and 774
(1952)
7 MIAmn L.Q. 118 (1952)
24 ROCKY MT.
53 COLUM. L. Ilzv. 1161 (1953)
26 TEMp. L.Q. 420 (1953)
27 TEMP. L.Q. 115 (1953)
39 VA. L. REV. 976 (1958)
22 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 363 (1954)
67 HARv. L. REv. 492 (1954)
38 MINN. L. REV. 397 (1954)
29 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1140 (1954)
8 RUTGRFS L. REv. 407 (1954)
34 NEB. L. REv. 645 (1955)
1955 U. ILL. L. FonRM 158
1955 Wis. L. REv. 672
45 GEO. L.J. 306 (1957)
30 TEMP. L.Q. 203 (1957)
L. REV. 265 (1952)
LAW BOOK ANNOTATIONS
ANN. CAS. 1913D 345 (1913) ANN. CAS. 1914B 902 (1914)
52 A.L.R. 800 (1928)
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